Terrorism: How Obama Embraced 'Wishful Thinking'

“One wonders what level of confidence (low, medium or high) the intelligence community attached to its judgment that the Benghazi attack was related to an anti-Islam video and spontaneous and how already emerging dissenting views arguing the attack was preplanned were presented to senior officials.” – Former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden

Obama Administration's Wishful Thinking On Terrorism
By Michael V. Hayden

CNN
October 11, 2012
http://www.cnn.com

Even as last month's events in Benghazi, Libya, become clearer (it was a terrorist attack), the aftermath of Benghazi on American politics and on American policy is far from settled.
The immediate question is why did it take so long to characterize accurately what happened there?
Writing in The Daily Beast, respected diplomatic observer Leslie Gelb answers that question by reverting to a well-used theme when he blames current policy and political problems on the quality of the intelligence. Commenting on Ambassador Susan Rice's serial talk-show assertions that the Benghazi attack was "spontaneous," he opines that Rice's "mistake was taking the initial intelligence at face value." . . . .

This theme of intelligence shortcomings was carried over by multiple government officials cited in a lengthy Wall Street Journal piece that outlined "shifting views within the intelligence community" as one source of the administration's problems.
According to the Journal's sources, early intelligence reports of an al Qaeda connection to the Benghazi attack were discounted by the White House, following the lead of the director of national intelligence. . . . .

One wonders what level of confidence (low, medium or high) the intelligence community attached to its judgment that the Benghazi attack was related to an anti-Islam video and spontaneous and how already emerging dissenting views arguing the attack was preplanned were presented to senior officials.
In any event, given the administration's existing narrative about its success against al Qaeda and the inherent attractiveness of the spontaneous attack plotline (a spontaneous attack would be neither predictable nor preventable and therefore less likely to invite blame for a lack of sufficient security), there were likely strong instincts in the White House to accept and publicize the original director of national intelligence assessment regardless of confidence levels or competing analysis. . . . .

With that "victory," Libya was predictably thrown into chaos: no central government, no institutions of civil society, fractious armed militias, a budding jihadist movement in the east, lingering regionalism and tribalism elsewhere. Predictable consequences were not confined to Libya. Awash with weapons and fleeing mercenaries, northern Mali was broken off from the center and became a haven for a strengthening al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
How prepared were we for these predictable consequences? Clearly Ambassador Chris Stevens threw his heart and soul and ultimately his life into trying to shape a positive future. But were the full government's efforts adequate to the task we helped create? . . . .

Some may think that wise and are prepared to live with the consequences. One only hopes that the calculation of the consequences has been carefully done, based on hard realities, and not on the kind of wishful thinking that would turn a complex, synchronized terrorist attack into a kind of jihadist flash mob.

**In compliance with copyright laws, this version of the editorial is excerpted**